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Substantial numbers of citizens are disaffected with the entire ap-
paratus of the law. In recent years commentators have begun to make
the connection between this disaffection and the failure of the legal
profession to make recourse to the law possible for the poor and much
of the middle class.' For the poor or otherwise disadvantaged, the law
often appears exploitative rather than protective because they cannot
command legal services equivalent to those of the rich.2 For the middle
class, the law is often so cumbersome and expensive that it seems poorly
designed for the practical resolution of disputes.3
As one response to the perceived crisis in legal services, the organized
bar as well as some of its critics have focused attention on the incidence
of "unethical" behavior occurring especially among solo practitioners.
But fundamental disagreement has arisen over whether the relation of
unethical conduct to failure of service is one of cause or effect. The
ABA has regarded deviance from the profession's code of ethics as at
least one cause of the mounting criticism of the organized bar, and has
therefore resorted to clarifying and enforcing the code as its primary
response to the crisis in legal services.4 Several leading commentators
1. The legal profession's critics include Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. who
has indicted the legal profession for the "obsolescence" of its "code of ethics and institu-
tions" in our time of "social upheaval." Brennan, The Responsibilities of the Legal
Profession, in THE PATH OF THE LAw FaO. 1967, at 91-92 (A. Sutherland ed. 1968). See
also Nader, Crumbling of the Old Order-Law Schools and the Law Fiins, TIE NEWY
REPLTBLic 20 (Oct. 11, 1969); REPORT OF THE AmEiRICm ASSmMLY, LAW AND THE CtHANCIN
SocIETY 1 (1968); Rostow, The Lawyer and His Client (Alexander F. Morrison Foundation
Lecture for 1961) (part 1) 48 A.B.A.J. 1 (1961); W. S RIGFE.LLow, MY PEOPLE Is Tm E.vNEY
54 (1964) [hereinafter cited as STIrGFELLOW].
2. Theodore Voorhees, past president of the National Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion, has written that, to poor people, the "law" is "a vague and misunderstood force that
seems always opposed to the poor: justice is a concept beyond comprehension." Voorhees,
The OEO Legal Service Program: Should The Bar Support It?, 53 A.B.A.J. 23. See also
REPORT OF THm NATiONAL ADVISORY Coinsussro oN CtviL DisorDERs (1968); STrNrzFrELLo%v
supra note 1; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, CONFERENCE PRO-
CEEINGs, THE ExTENsIoN OF LEGAL SERVICEs TO THm POOR, ADDRIESS OF NIcuoLAs KATzEuNDAC1
9, 13-14 (1964) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE PRoCEEINGs].
. E. CHEATHrm, A LAwYER WHEN NEEDED 59-86 Charpentier Lectures (1963) [herein-
after cited as CuEATHAS]; Note, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil
Matters: The Problem, the Duty, and a Solution, 26 U. Prir. L. REV. 811 (1965). The pri-
mary focus in this Note will be on the function of law and of law)'ers in providing civil
remedies for wrongs suffered. This emphasis stems from an appreciation of the different
considerations operative in the criminal context and from the fact that the actual and
potential contact of citizens with the law is overwhelmingly made up of civil matters. See
generally, CHEATHAm, supra.
4. The Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards was appointed on August
14, 1964, at the request of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., then president of the American Bar Ano.
ciation. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIT, Preface, at v (Final Draft, July
1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA COD]. The Special Committee completed work on the Code
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on legal ethics, on the other hand, have been highly critical of the
ABA's position and have proposed as an alternative a context-oriented
approach, an approach that views unethical conduct as an almost in-
evitable effect of certain pressures at the bar's marginal levels and
therefore not reachable through uniform standards.5
This Note considers the wisdom of these alternative approaches to
legal ethics as they affect the crisis in legal services. The thesis de-
veloped here is that neither of the major proposals advanced thus far
can by itself be an effective antidote to the law's frequent short-
comings; both are based on a faith in professionalism which prevents
the development of realistic solutions to the problem of delivering
the needed quantity of legal services.
I.
For many lawyers, the practice of law is a profoundly disillusioning
experience. Approximately fifty per cent of at least the metropolitan
bar are solo practitioners. 6 These lawyers have for the most part found
unattainable the prestige and economic rewards which were their most
important goals in entering the legal profession.7 Excluded from me-
dium to large-sized law firms by hiring practices that have traditionally
been restrictive along educational, racial, ethnic, and religious lines,
"success" has been very difficult for blacks, for members of religious
and ethnic minorities, and for sons of non-professionals., The inability
of Professional Responsibility during the summer of 1969 and the ABA House of Delegates
passed the Final Draft on August 12, 1969.
5. See, e.g., J. CARLIN, LAwYERs ON THEmR OwN 3 (1962).
6. Approximately 53% of all lawyers in private practice are individual practitioners.
The discussion in this Note is most relevant to private practitioners in urban areas where
solos comprise about 51% of the total population of lawyers. AMt. BAR FOUNDATION, Tiu;
1967 LAwYER STATI TICAL REPORT 18 (1968). For a discussion of the social structure,
ethics and social control of the bar in a middle-sized community, see J. HANDLER, Ti!
LAWYER AND HIS COasssUNrrY (1967).
7. J. CARLIN, LAW.m ON TIr OWN 1-3 (1962).
Until fairly recently, writing on the sociology of the legal profession has been In a rather
rudimentary state. In the last ten years, this has begun to be remedied. See, e.g., J. CAILIN,
CALIN, LAWYERS ON THm OWN (1962); J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' EThics (1966?; N. WNAnKOV,
LAWYEMES IN THE MAKING (1965); E. SuasGE, THE WALL STm"rr LAWYER (1964); Ladinsky,
The Impact of Social Backgrounds of Lawyers on Law Practice and the Law, 16 J. LCOAI.
ED. 127 (1963); Reisman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment Training and Colleagueship,
9 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1957).
8. Individual practitioners in Ladinsky's sample were more likely than firm lawyers to
be from ethnic minorities (59% of the individual practitioners, but only 10% of the firm
lawyers were from families in which the father was first or second generation American), to
have a father with a manual occupation ( 30% v. 7%); to be Catholic or Greek Orthodox
(34% v. 26%) or Jewish (35% v. 6%); and to be from Eastern or Southern Europe (50% v.
6%). Ladinsky, The Impact of Social Backgrounds of Lawyers on Law Practice and the Lawo,
16 J. LEcAL ED. 131, 137-39 (1963). See also J. CARLIN, LAwYERs' Ernes 28-37 (1966).
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of these lawyers to enter established firms has forced them into solo
practice. And although the solo practitioner is the exemplar of the
lawyer, at least in popular lore, the average income of solo practitioners
in most metropolitan areas is less than half that of lawyers practicing
in firms of two or more men.9 It is this large group of solo practitioners
that serves the poor and much of the middle class, and its failure to
perform this function effectively has led to renewed interest in the
problems of "marginal practice."' 0
Success or failure, in the sense of the relative position of lawyers
Nithin the bar's income and prestige hierarchy, has long been explained
by "respectable" segments of the profession exclusively in individual
terms: those who lack learning or virtue become marginal lawyers.1 '
What has concerned the leaders of the profession about marginal prac-
tice has been the pervasiveness of "unethical" behavior at that level. 12
It is the lawyer serving the poor and the middle class who is cited most
often by ethics committees for advertising, ambulance-chasing and using
lay intermediaries as methods of getting business' 3-all in violation of
the canons. Marginal practitioners also adhere less frequently to widely-
held community norms. The "shyster" lawyer who has caused so much
of the public to be distrustful of all lawyers is not a member of a
successful medium or large-sized firm; he is an independent operator
who preys upon the poor or otherwise dependent and whose reputation
represents the cumulative impact of exhorbitant fees, fraud, lack of
training, lack of concern for the client, a willingness to peddle influence
and to play the role of fixer/manipulator' 4
The linking of "unethical" behavior to the failure of the poor and
the middle class to receive legal services of an acceptable quantity and
quality 5 provided the impetus for translation of the bar's long-standing
9. In New York, the average net income of solo practitioners as disclosed in the 1963
IRS Statistics of Income was $7,579. Meanwhile, lawyers practidng in firms of tw'o or more
men in New York had an average net income of $22,559. Other representative jurisdictions
include: California-solo $12,114, firm $22,707; Illinois--solo $10,263, firm $21,819; Michi-
gan--solo $8,308, firm $23,342; Pennsylvania--solo $9,773, firm $20,623. Smith & Clifton,
Income of Lawyers, 1963-64, 54 A.B.AJ. 51, 52 (1968).
10. The phrase "marginal practice" belongs to Carlin, who uses the words to denote
those practitioners discussed at TAN 6-9.
11. See, e.g., Smith, Canon Two: "The Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in
Performing Its Duty To Make Legal Services Available," 48 T-xAs L. REv. 285, 290 1970).
12. Hazard, Foreword, in J. CARLIN, LAwvyEm' ETHicS (1966).
13. J. CARuN, LAws' ETHIcS 41-65 (1966).
14. See generally J. CARLIN, LAwYEas' ETHics (1966).
15. At its inception, the Committee on Re-evaluation of the Canons of Professional
Ethics took as part of its responsibility a "(careful reevaluation (of] the extent to which
departures from high ethical standards and lapses in strict enforcement [were] related to
the content of the canons." [Emphasis supplied] American Bar News, Sept. 15, 1964, at 2,
coL 1. As the Committee's work developed, however, it became apparent that the concern
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concern with unethical behavior among marginal practitioners into a
program aimed at clarifying the profession's code of ethics and increas-
ing the severity of its sanctions.16 But the ABA's emphasis on the Code
of Professional Responsiblity as its major weapon in dealing with the
problem of inadequate legal services indicates that it is more concerned
with improving the quality of legal services than with increasing the
quantity of services. Directed against conduct thought detrimental to
the production of high quality services, the Code apparently assumes
that if individual lawyers perform the tasks they undertake with skill
and care, the legal profession's responsibility to society can be met-
or at least public criticism of the lawyer defused.
11
The marginal practitioners who are principally affected by the Bar
Association's strategy in this regard generally support as a class the
strengthening of the profession's code of ethics.18 They regard it as a
defensive bulwark against competition from other attorneys and from
lay groups.19 Intra-professional competition has long been officially
frowned on by the bar,20 but despite measures proscribing competitive
devices as "unethical," competition continues in only slightly muted
forms. Meanwhile, competition from lay groups is an even more threat-
ening fact in the life of the marginal practitioner-banks, trust com-
panies, title companies, savings and loan associations, tax companies,
accountants and real estate brokers successfully attract many of the
clients and much of the work that the marginal practitioner regards as
his own. 21 Caught up in a fierce struggle for professional existence, the
marginal practitioner relies on the code of ethics to disarm his
opponents.
with content was not in the direction of a reevaluation of the basic principles announccd
in the Canons of Professional Ethics, but with their ineffectiveness in acting as guides for
behavior and as a basis for disciplinary action.
16. Wright, The New Code of Professional Responsibility, in The Path of the Law
From 1967, at 121 (A. Sutherland ed. 1968); Armstrong, A Re.evaluation of the Canons
of Professional Ethics, A Practitioner and Bar Association Viewpoint, 83 TrNN, L. Rrv.
154 (1966); Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the indi.
vidual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 438 (1965); PROFESSlONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160 (1958),.
17. See, e.g., American Bar News, Sept. 1964 at 1, col. 1; Tucker, The Large Law Firm,
Considerations Concerning the Modernization of the Canons of Professional Ethics, 1965
Wis. L. REv. 344, 350 (1965); Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competance of
the Legal Profession, 48 TExAs L. REv. 267, 268 (1970).
18. J. CARLIN, LAWY-RS' ETmICS 70 (1966).
19. In addition to seeing the code as a defensive mechanism, the marginal practitioner
often regards the existence of the code and of the ritualistic fictions implicit in it as es-
sential to his self-image as a professional. See Schuckman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The
Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WAsh. L. REv. 244, 245 (1968).
20. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canons 10 (acquiring interest in litigation), 12
(minimum fees), 27 (advertising), 28 (solicitation), 33 (use of partnership names), 43 (ap.
proved last lists), 45 (specialization). See also ABA CODE, Canon 2, at 13-43.
21. J. CaRLIN, LAWYERS ON THIRm OWN 41-116 1962).
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Thus the code of ethics is regarded as serving the valid interests of
both the marginal and elite segments of the bar. But for a number of
reasons, the approach embodied in the Code has slight chance either
of lessening the incidence of "unethical" conduct or of improving the
quantity of legal services available to the poor and the middle class.
II.
Jerome Carlin, in ground-breaking sociological studies of private
practitioners in Chicago22 and New York City,2 has been the most influ-
ential critic of the ABA's approach to the problems of unethical conduct
and inadequate service. He has suggested that the ineffectiveness of the
ABA's old Canons of Professional Ethics2 4 can be traced to the tendency
of both the dominant segments of the profession and of the marginal
practitioners "to conceive of professional norms as existing independent
of the social and organizational context within which they are meant to
operate." 25 This is unfortunate, Carlin argues, because the ability of
the marginal practitioner to adhere to the profession's code of ethics is
determined in large part by the "pattern of opportunities and pressures
to which he is exposed in his practice " . 2.."2-0 The uncertain and non-
repeating character of his clientele, the necessity to combat the un-
restrained competition of laymen, the corrupting influence of the lower
courts and agencies of government with which he deals, the non-sup-
portive nature of his colleague group, and the condescension of the
relatively more successful lawyers who regard themselves as superior
to him socially and professionally, all contribute to a deep-seated dis-
satisfaction with the law as a profession and to a willingness to violate
at least the letter of the rules set out by the "elite" who drafted the
Code.27
Carlin does not suggest that the profession's code of ethics should be
22. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON TAm OwN (1962).
23. J. CARLIN, LAWYER& ETICS (1966).
24. Although both of Carlin's studies were undertaken in reference to the old Canons of
Professional Ethics, the form of his analysis and his findings are directly releiant to a dis-
cussion of the new Code of Professional Responsibility. For a discussion of specific canons
of the new Code in light of Carlin's theory of legal ethics, see pp. 1184-86 injra.
25. J. CARLIN, LAwyERS Emics 6 (1966).
26. Id. 7.
27. J. CARLIN, LAwYEs ON TREm OwN 168-200 (1962). With varying degrees of self.
consciousness, an actor may depart from established ethical norms while justifying such de-
parture to himself and allowing no sense of inconsistency to develop in his affirmation of
the binding effect of the code on other individuals. D. MA'TzA, DE u.QuEcy AND DnF'r,
60-62 (1954). See also, J. PIKE, BEYOND THE LAw 14-16 (1963). To a great extent, this
technique appears to have been operative in the ethical transgressions of marginal prac-
titioners. J. CAR-IN, LAwYERs' Enucs 81-82 (1966).
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scrapped entirely, but he does argue that the bar will be forever unsuc-
cessful in its attempt fundamentally to affect "unethical" behavior by
rule-making;2 s even the quality goals of leaders of the bar can be
achieved only if a concurrent effort is launched greatly to expand the
demand for legal services by those who currently seek other means to
resolve their problems. Only such a stimulation of demand can neu-
tralize the economic pressures toward "unethical" behavior. Carlin
proposes measures such as government subsidy, pre-paid insurance
plans, the neighborhood law office, and group legal practice "to increase
and stabilize the demand for legal services," thereby enhancing the
economic security of marginal practitioners and eliminating the tempta-
tion to indulge in unethical behavior.20
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility represents a net
improvement over the sixty-one year old Canons of Professional Ethics
in the latitude it allows individual practitioners in responding to vari-
able conditions of practice, the new Code still contains numerous provi-
sions that are at odds with Carlin's suggestions. And since the Code's
enactment by the ABA, these provisions have received the most sus-
tained criticism.Y0
For example, the Code provides that "[a] lawyer who has given un-
solicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal
action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice . . .. 3
Despite the general principle stated in Canon Two that "A Lawyer
Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty To Make
Legal Counsel Available,"32 no real concession is made in this proscrip-
tion to variable conditions of the lawyer's practice.0 3 And although
28. The fallacy of normative determinism is explored in Blake & Davis, Norms, Values
and Sanctions, in HANOBOOK OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY (R. Faris ed. 1964):
The blueprint theory of society does not fit the facts of social existence. Societies as w
know them are highly active and dynamic, filled with conflict, striving, deceit, cunning,
Behavior in a given situation tends to be closely related to that situation, to be strongly
affected by individual interests, to be unpredictable from a knowledge of the norms
alone.
Id. 464.
29. J. CARLIN, LAwYEas' ETmics 181 (1966).
30. Joost, Professional Responsibility, The Missing Dimension, TRIAL 20 (June/July
1969); Wallace, The Code of Professional Responsibility-Legislated lrrelevance , 43
TExAs L. REv. 311 (1970).
31. A.B.A. CODE, DR 2-104 (A). See also DR 2-103 (A), which specifies that "A lawyer
shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or as.
sociate to a nbn-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer."
32. A.B.A. CODE, Canon 2, at 13. Recognition by the American Bar Association of an
affirmative duty in this regard represents a significant departure from the Canons, which
did not specifically provide for such an obligation. According to the ABA Ethics Com.
mittee, however, such a duty was implicit in the old Canons and was binding on all mem.
bers of the profession. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHiCS, OPINION No. 820 (1968).
33. The Code makes a limited concession to some forms of institutional advertising,
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enormous differences exist in the ability of prospective clients to recog-
nize legal problems and to gain access to the legal system, "1 it is as
unethical for lawyers to advertise or solicit in Harlem as it is on Wall
Street.
To take a further example, the Code permits group service arrange-
ments35 "only in those instances and to the extent that controlling
constitutional interpretation at the time of the rendition of the services
requires the allowance of such legal service activities ... ."0 Nowhere
in the Code is there a hint of the desirability of contextual variation or
of a willingness to engage in the balancing of interests apparently re-
Examples of permissible activities include preparation of institutional advertisements
and professional articles for lay publications and participation in seminars, lectures,
and civic programs. But a lawyer who participates in such activities should shun
personal publicity.
One of the means by which the bar has attempted to alert people of moderate means to
the legal services that are available is the lawyer referral service. Sce, ABA CODE, EC 2-15,
at 16. The lawyer referral service involves the use of local attorne)s who have agreed to
provide counseling at a moderate fee to prospective clients referred to them. These clients
generally contact the service office in response to a program of public education under-
taken by the local bar. As of 1965, approximately 220 referral services were in operation
across the country, involving some 17,000 lawyers and 150,000 clients per year. McAlpin,
The Bar Faces Forward, 51 A.B.A.J. 548 (1965).
The lawyer referral service has proved to be a useful device in alleviating the legal service
void for people of moderate means, but it is questionable that its continued use or expan-
sion can provide any long-range solution to the legal service needs of the middle class. It is
even more doubtful whether such services can have an appreciable effect in making legal
services more accessible to the poor. At least three reasons for this can he identified: (1) law-
yer referral services have not received sufficient support from local bar associations to ensure
their success; (2) such plans do not eliminate the need for specialization or continuing
legal services at moderate prices; and (3) referral services conducted by the bar do little to
reduce the impersonality or randomness in lawyer selection that is implicit in alternatives
such as group legal services. Certainly, the continued growth of group legal services and
the persistence of unauthorized practitioners indicates that lawyer referral services have
been less than unqualified successes. On the referral service alternative, see Christensen,
Lawyer Referral Service: An Alternative to Lay-Group Legal Services, 12 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. (1965); Madden & Christensen, Lawyer Referral Serv'ice: A Sensible Approach to
a Difficult Problem, 49 A.B.AJ. 965 (1963); Gallantz, Lawyer Referral, A Brief History,
45 J. Amt. Jun. Soc. 806 (1962).
34. [I]t may be suggested that traditional notions about solicitation do not fit com-
fortably the plight of the poor and the alienated. Programs of consumer and slum
tenant education may generate 'legal business', to be sure, but this is a world amay
from the evils against which the relevant canons were drawn.
Frankel, Experiments in Serving the Indigent, 51 A.B.A.J. 460, 463 (1963). See also Zeitz,
Survey of Negro Attitudes to Law 19, cited in Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and
Class Justice, 12 U.C.L-.A L. REv. 381, 430 (1965).
35. The literature on group legal services is considerable. Many of the articles on the
subject deal primarily with the constitutional issues involved: see, e.g., Comment, 63
CoLum. L. REV. 1502 (1963); Note, Group Legal Services, 79 HAnv. L. REV. 416 (1965). Others
go beyond the purely legal questions and treat a broader range of issues: see, e.g., Zimroth,
Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YA.E L.J. 966 (1967); Cheatham, A Lawyer
When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 973 (1963);
Schwartz, Foreword: Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.LA. L. REv. 279 (19M).
The controversy over group legal services and the relevant literature is placed in perspective
in an excellent monograph by Barlow Christensen of the American Bar Foundation: Group
IS-GAL SEvicrs (1967).
36. ABA CODE, DR 2-103 (D) (5), at 25.
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quired by the Supreme Court in recent cases.37 As with solicitation, the
Code abjures any responsibility for allowing experimentation with
group arrangements,38 even in situations where the potential of such
arrangements for meeting the public's need for legal services seems
stronger than their potentially negative effects.
The basic flaw in the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility
from the perspective of its most influential critics, then, lies in the
monolithic and inflexible character of its provisions. With only limited
exceptions, the Code incorporates the flaws that Carlin perceived in the
Canons of Professional Ethics: the Code relies too heavily on the efficacy
of norms as instruments of social control and does not pay sufficient
attention to variability in the contexts in which those norms are meant
to operate. 9 The effect of this must be to inhibit the structural changes
that are the necessary prerequisites to any significant extension of legal
services and to the rejuvenation of presently marginal practice.
III.
The contextual approach to the problems of marginal practice has
substantial intuitive appeal. The legal profession should regard a cer-
tain amount of diversity in modes of delivery of legal services as a
source of strength rather than of weakness. A cursory examination of
professions reveals that all, to some degree, "consist of a loose amalga-
mation of segments," 40 and that their dynamic quality and ability to
adjust to changing conditions derives from this heterogeneity. But be-
cause the dominant segments of the bar have no contact with the harsh
37. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Virginla e.v
rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). Beginning with the Button case, the Supreme
Court has begun to step into the hitherto sanctified chambers of the legal profession to
indicate that changing conditions have rendered the traditional structure of the profession
constitutionally deficient in some respects. The cumulative effect of Button and Its progeny
is to signal a new departure in constitutional adjudication in situations of conflict between
individual rights and the traditional prerogatives of the bar: the Court has "served notice
that no longer [is] the practice of law to be considered a 'privilege,' to be treated by ex.
elusive reference to the professional standard without regard to the other social Interests
which might be involved." Schwartz, Foreword: Group Legal Services in Perspectlve, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 279, 283 (1965).
38. ABA CODE, DR 2-103 (D) (5), at 25.
39. See Schuckman, supra note 19, at 244, 256-57, for the proposition that a good mena.
sure of contextual variability is built into the profession's code of ethics sub rosa, i.e,, by
virtue of what it does not cover. Neither the Canons nor the Code prescribe the forms of
advertising and solicitation most often undertaken by the elite, for example, entertainment
by clients, use of dubs. See also E. SMiGEL, TnE WALL STnREE LAWYeR. 293-94 (1964), for it
view of the Wall Street lawyer as an organization man whose professional life seeing In con-
flict with many of the principles of the Code.
40. Bucher and Strauss, Professions in Process, 66 AM. J. or Soc. 325, at 833 (1961).
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realities of marginal practice, and because they have an inadequate
appreciation of the public's need for certain kinds of services, the re-
forms Carlin suggests are blocked.41
The organized bar has thus far regarded external pressures for change,
such as mandates issuing from the Supreme Court as misguided
efforts tending to destroy the functional independence of the legal
profession. In reality, Carlin charges, the sum of the bar's response, at
least as late as 1964, suggests that "it may be less concerned with extend-
ing legal services than with preserving its monopolistic control over the
provision of such services." 43
In spite of the aura with which the ABA has attempted to surround it,
the Code of Professional Responsibility is undeniably of political and
economic rather than spiritual derivation." In any code of ethics, some
norms, relating chiefly to truthfulness and fair dealing, can be codified
without much attention to differences in conditions of practice, be-
cause all members of the community, professional and other, are ex-
pected to abide by these values. Other provisions of the ABA's Code of
Professional Responsibility, however, respond to demands within the
group itself and do not find a clear referent in community stan-
dards.45 Such norms are not immutable in the sense of having a life
apart from the segment or segments of the bar responsible for their
formulation.
46
Those in control of the legal profession at any point in time will be
sorely tempted to use the code of ethics as a weapon to perpetuate their
position of control, or to prevent even small shifts in the balance of
power within the profession. 47 A large element of this motive appears
to have been at work in the codification of the bar's resistance to group
legal services.48
As individuals and without regard to their respective positions within
the professional hierarchy, members of a profession also acquire a vested
41. J. CAxuN, LAwYERs' ETrucs 87, 181-82 (1966).
42. Cases cited note 37 supra.
43. J. CARLN, LAWYERS' ETHics 180 (1966).
44. For an account of the political accomodations and changes in Canon Two from the
Preliminary to the Final Draft, see Nahstoll, Limitations on Group Legal Services Arrange.
ments under the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-103 (D) (5); Stale Wine in New
Bottles, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 334, 343-45 (1970).
45. See, e.g., ABA CODE, DR 2-102 (professional notices, letterheads, offices and law
lists): DR 2-107 (division of fees among lawyers): DR 3-103 (forming a partnership with a
non-lawyer): DR 8-102 (statements concerning judges and other adjudicatory officers).
46. Schuckman, supra note 19, at 257-58.
47. Cf. Lynn, Introduction to the Issue, Symposium, "The Professions:' 92 D~AEA.us
649, 652, (1963).
48. See Nahstoll, supra note 58, at 348 n. 85.
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interest in the status quo that militates against a highly permissive
code of ethics. If adopted, Carlin's proposals to allow group legal ser-
vices (with their potential for economy and efficiency) and to liberalize
rules regarding advertising would produce increased intra-professional
competition; practitioners will inevitably regard such a development as
presenting a dangerous threat to their own means of livelihood.49
Whatever the merits of proposed changes in the Code, the profession's
interest in certain forms of practice keeps the Code as it is. The
Code's restrictions on the use of advertisingu0 and its generally nega-
tive approach toward specialization 1 are examples of this tendency
at work.
Given the existence of these interests and the high degree of stratifi-
cation that already exists within the legal profession, there is a certain
inconsistency in Carlin's suggestion that fundamental changes can be
brought about by the bar's tinkering with its code of ethics. Carlin ap-
pears to regard the bar's professionalism as a salutary given62 or as an
end earnestly to be sought after, and his analysis consequently takes
place within the confines of a professional model.5 3 His inattentiveness
49. The bar's attempt to restrict entry into the profession may derive from some of the
same sort of motivations, especially to provide higher incomes for "authorized" practi.
tioners. See generally, Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controersy--A Struggle
Among Power Groups, 4 KAN. L. Rav. 1, 5 (1965).
50. See Wilbur, Advertising, Solicitation, and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REV. 677, 684
(1954): "Perhaps, too, underlying the condemnation of solicitation is the idea that equality
of opportunity will more nearly prevail in the profession when all are subject to the saie
restrictions." See also Armstrong, A Re-evaluatlon of the Canons of Professional Ethics, A
Practitioner and Bar Association Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 154, 161 (1966): "Unless
universal standards are maintained, the ethical lawyer, as I have said, will be placed at an
economic disadvantage. . . [and he] will lose the thing which is most important to him-
his own high opinion and his own high standards of his profession."
51. ABA CoDE, DR 2-105 (A) (4), at 27. For the thesis that the profession's conservatism
in this area may be an outgrowth of the hesitancy of the large firms to allow the diffusion
of the advantages presently accruing to them in a situation of de facto specialization, see
Wallace, supra note 30, at 318.
52. A number of Carlin's suggestions would tend to undermine some of the traditional
indicia of professionalism. To the extent that legal services became commercialized through
private advertising or that group arrangements diminish the lawyer's previous Indepen-
dence, they could be regarded, at least in a theoretical sense, as antiprofessional. At least
one commentator on the Code of Professional Responsibility has seen these elements as
"indeed... basic to the whole concept of professionalism." Smith, supra note 11, at 286.
53. Despite the importance of professions in American society, writing in the field Is
still in a rudimentary state. A good introduction to the professional phenomenon 15
A. CARR-SAUNDERs & P. WiLSON, Tm PROFESSIONS (1933). Carr-Saunders & Wilson wrote
of English professional life. No comparable American study has yet appeared. We do
possess some outstanding studies of individual professions and some general studies
that are less ambitious in scope than Carr-Saunders & Wilson, including: T. PAPsONs,
STRUCTURES AND PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1960); Symposium, The Professions, 92
DAEDALUS 647 (1963); Goode, Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging Proessions.
Psychology, Sociology, and Medicine, 25 AM. Soc. REv. 902 (1960); Goode, Community
Within a Community: The Professions, 22 Am. Soc. REv. 194 (1957); Merton, Soma
Thoughts on the Professions in American Society, Brown Univ. Papers, No. XXXVII
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to non-professional solutions to the crisis in legal services and to un-
ethical behavior derives from two assumptions: first, that many of the
legal problems confronting the poor are potentially as complex as those
of the rich and therefore require lawyers of as great skill;54 and second,
that the ability of the poor to compete for legal services in the open
marketplace will always be seriously impaired by their chronic lack of
funds.55 He therefore advises that the present scope of the legal profes-
sion's monopoly should be retained intact to assure quality. Absolute
ethical standards, however, should be replaced by a balancing test
administered by the bar on an ad hoc basis. This balance would pre-
sumably take into account both the public's need for certain kinds of
services and the profession's interest in preserving a basic uniformity
in work patterns.
But if a balancing test of some sort were to be at all successful in
introducing tolerance for the demands of variable conditions of practice,
the leaders of the bar would have to develop a far greater sensitivity
to and sympathy for the requirements of diverse clientele and work
tasks than now exists. Where the true interests of the public and of the
marginal practitioner are underrepresented in its administration, a sys-
tem of flexible rules will produce results no different than current
absolute standards of propriety."" And as long as the elite and the
marginal practitioner perceive a common interest in preventing the
emergence of new forms of practice, reform as urged by Carlin will
be impossible.
Even if Carlin were to be successful in liberalizing the legal profes-
sion's code of ethics, however, such a reform in the long run would very
likely amount to little more than a palliative. He calls for flexibility in
procedures, but concludes that a uniform level of training and a "pro-
fessional" allegiance should be required of all legal personnel. Insofar
as this position assumes comparable complexity of legal problems at
all strata of society, it can be criticized. The contact of poor people with
(1960); Merton, The Functions of the Professional Association, 58 Am,. J. oF Nuts c 50
(1954); The Professions and Social Structure, 17 Soc. FoacEs 457 (1939).
54. Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rp.
381, 586-407 (1965).
55. Id. 428-29.
56. It is not at all dear why the public should allow the continuation of a situation
whereby the governed (marginal practitioners) have so little in common with those who
govern (the elite of the metropolitan bar). The problem with the alliance of two or more
disparate groups is that at certain times the best interests of the groups are likely to conflict.
Rules pertaining to solicitation provide a case in point: elite lawyers and the proper-
tied interests they represent are generally more concerned with the evils of solicitation
than are marginal practitioners or the poor. If the poor learn of their legal rights and
of the possibilities of securing representation through advertising, the advantages of land-
lords and businessmen may be threatened. Schuckman, supra note 19, at 265.
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the law tends to arise from landlord-tenant, consumer credit, family and
criminal law matters.57 The issues in these areas are simply not as con-
ceptually complex as are those involved in the legal problems of the
rich. 8 Where complexities do exist, they are often the fault of the
profession itself, which out of neglect or design has allowed the prolif-
eration of a procedural maze. o
Furthermore, Carlin's conclusion that the poor and middle class can-
not subsidize their own legal services is also open to serious question.
The increasing competitive pressures from lay agencies for the control
of many of the work tasks of the marginal practitioner, and the success
of these agencies despite the virulence of the bar's campaign against
unauthorized practice,0 0 suggest both an unexploited market for legal
services and the potential economies of specializing and routinizing
those services. Despite protests from the bar, title companies continue to
search and to clear titles, banks and savings and loan associations con-
tinue to close land deals using standardized forms and to set up trusts
and estates, tax offices continue to process enormous numbers of in-
dividual and business returns, individual accountants and accounting
firms continue to advise clients in legal matters, and estate planners
continue to plan. The explanation is apparent: in the words of one
commentator, "Laymen go to unauthorized practitioners who are ac-
cessible, whose charges they do not fear, and whose dependability they
rely on because of connections with familiar institutions they trust."0'
The very pervasiveness of the law, especially in the lives of the poor,
suggests that many legal matters are simple-requiring the services of
trained intermediaries for satisfactory disposition, but intermediaries
of a rather low-level skill. 62 Sustained contact with the law and the insti-
57. Dolan, Where Will Ursula Go? 55 A.B.A.J. 1046 (1969); Frankel, Experinents in
Serving the Indigent, 51 A.BA.J. 460 (1965).
58. STRINGFELLOW, supra note 1, at 44.
59. The Ethical Considerations set out in Canon Eight of the Code of Professional
Responsibility apparently recognize the criticism lodged here regarding the unnecessary
prolixity of the legal system as a function of the self-interest of lawyers as a class. See,
e.g., ABA CODE, EC 8-2, at 107; See also ABA CODE, EC 8-1, at 106; Professional Responsi.
bility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1217 (1958).
The argument that is developed in this section is that the prolixity of the law derives
from too jealous guarding of work-tasks that need not-and some that should not-be
performed by lawyers. Before the goals of simplifying and updating the law, which are
embodied in Canon Eight, can be realized, the bar as a whole must come to grips with
the fact that full enforcement or true commitment to the canons will undermine further,
at least in the short run, the economic position of many marginal practitioners.
60. J. CARLIN, LAwYiRS ON THEIR OwN 157 (1962).
61. CHEATHAM, supra note 3, at 63-64. See also SPECIAL COmbunrEE ON THE ECONOMIC
CoNwrrson OF THE BAR, REPORT, 63 A.B.AJ. Rr.P. 890, 391 (1938).
62. Paulsen, The Legal Needs of the Poor and Family Law, in CONrERNCE PROCErEINGS,
THE EXTENSION OF LEGAL SERviCEs TO THE PooR 19 (1964).
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tutions of government requires sustained assistance, but it is just this
species of sustained, low-level assistance that traditional legal practi-
tioners-highly trained and oriented toward discrete cases-do not
supply.63 The lawyer's expertise in handling the litigative aspects of
cases often results in success being measured in terms of cases won
rather than in real results obtained for the individual clients. If
the poor and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the middle class are to be
assisted in managing their contact with the law and the various institu-
tions of government, they must be educated to their rights and remedies,
and more liberal use must be made of the talents of laymen and other
professionals: social workers, marriage counselors, employment advisors,
psychiatrists, welfare personnel.0 4
The bar's resistance to mass production techniques and competition
from laymen is phrased in terms of preserving the strength of the legal
profession as a viable element in our society and in terms of ensuring
the quality of legal services.0" The lack of attention to quantity consid-
erations is in some respects reminiscent of the tactics of the old voca-
tional guilds.60 The leaders of the various guilds controlled entry into
their select groups and strictly regulated activities of members. Guild
members stubbornly refused to alter their methods of doing things and
were highly protective of the traditional scope of the work tasks en-
trusted to their care. Guild organization was advocated as necessary to
preserve the high quality of the goods produced and to safeguard the
honor and dignity of the avocation; to the extent that the goods pro-
duced by the guilds were other than luxuries, society's unfilled demand
for them could be met by a combination of charity and government
subsidy. But the hold of the guilds on the economy eroded with time,
for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was that the work tasks
they performed came to be accomplished more efficiently by groups
using methods which guilds refused to adopt, methods that made
obsolete much of the elaborate learning mastered by guild members.
The privileged status of the guilds could not be maintained when their
reason for being evaporated.
Substantive reform in the law, as opposed to changes in the legal pro-
63. ST=GFELLOW, supra note 1, at 44.
64. See ADDRESS OF NxCHOLAS KATZENBACH, CONFERENCE PocEED1Ns, supra note 2. at
13-14; McAlpin, supra note 33, at 550. See also Smith & Curran, A Study of the Lawyer-
Social Worker Professional Relationship, in Am. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARC i Co,.'mUtrruoNs
No. 6 (1968); Sparer, Thorkelson & Weiss, The Lay Advocate, 43 U. Dar. L.J. 493 (1966).
65. B. CHRISTENSEN, GROUP LEGAL SERVICES (1967).
66. IV. GELLnORN, INDiWmuAL FPtEEDoS AND GOVERNbMNTAL RsRsmAsrs 118, 143-45
(1956).
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fession's code of practice, is greatly inhibited by the problem of train-
ing; far too little attempt is made in law school to instill in students
either a critical faculty for spotting inherited anomalies in the law or a
conception of professional responsibility that leads to an impatience
with such anomalies0 7 Training also reinforces the idea that legal
matters are not simple, and thus provides lawyers with a rationalization
for their defense of the status quo. To simplify procedures or otherwise
demystify the law or to reduce the scope of the bar's monopoly might
vastly expand the total demand for legal services, but it would also
destroy employment opportunities for many lawyers.", While regarded
as dangerously radical by some members of the bar, Carlin's proposals
for making legal services available to more people-through govern-
ment subsidies, pre-paid insurance plans, group services-speak some-
what inadvertently to the bar's self-interest. Their effect would be to
retain intact our often antiquated legal system, and the bar's control over
that system, and would produce revenues for hitherto marginal prac-
titioners while not stimulating a general overhaul of the profession.
Carlin's reliance on transfer payments to subsidize legal services for
the poor has two obvious faults: taxing the well-to-do complicates the
system and produces resentment, and securing the poor their rights
through charity is inevitably degrading."0 A lowering of artificially high
transaction costs through the simplification of procedures and the
67. Communication of "professional" values is often regarded as one of the most Im-
portant tasks of legal education. See. e.g., Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teach.
ing Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEcAL D. 1 (1965).
68. It is infrequently the [solo practitioner's and small firm's] expertise which his
clients want. But they have need of his franchise, his small part of the monopoly
which the bar still has. Further, it is usually only in the truly closed shop and
pathological situations that the [solo practitioner] as a lawyer is sought. He is needed
for the small claims, domestic relations and surrogates courts open only to lawyers,
the personal injury cases which cannot be quickly settled and the closings which fell
through.
Schuckman, supra note 19, at 258.
69. At one point in the development of our legal system, legal aid was advanced as a
panacea to remedy denial of justice to the poor. This remedy was premised on a belief
that the problems faced by the poor, being legal, required the services of an attorney.
But in retrospect, it appears that legal aid and the logic that seemed to compel it failed
because of a flaw in the basic premise: because many of the tasks performed by
legal aid lawyers require only low-level skills, legal aid has not proved challenging enough
to prevent a quick and constant turnover among its young lawyers. Most of the lawyers
who have remained are aware of the intellectual and monetary sacrifices they have made
and this sense of personal sacrifice has spilled over into their legal aid work. Legal aid
clients are made painfully aware that in the area of legal services as elsewhere, they do not
command attention as a matter of right; the realization of their legal rights is dependent
on the incidence of societal largesse.
This situation is in marked contrast to the one which prevails in most medical aid
clinics. Medical aid clinics and public health services have been successful in attracting and
holding bright young doctors precisely because of the great range of unusual medical
problems that constantly confront public health doctors.
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redefinition of the bar's monopoly would allow the market, without
external supports, to apportion legal services more nearly in confor-
mance with the true needs of poor and middle class consumers of legal
services.70
IV.
The responsibility for fashioning a long-range solution to the current
crisis in legal services and to the dislocations of marginal practice rests
on the courts, legislatures and law schools: only these institutions have
the necessary psychic distance, economic independence and power to
effect significant changes.
The first step toward ensuring a better distribution of legal services
is to simplify currently outmoded statutory law so that rights and
remedies can be easily enforced. Much of the complexity to which land-
lord-tenant law has fallen heir, for example, could be eliminated with-
out jeopardizing the substantive rights of either group. Leases between
landlords and tenants should be standardized so that enormous advan-
tages do not accrue to the party who is favored by market forces and
has been able to employ the cleverest lawyer. Similarly, procedures
should be changed by state legislatures so that most wills could be
completed by laymen using standardized forms; administrative law
should be rewritten with the non-lawyer in mind so as to enable laymen
to proceed pro se before most commissions, including liquor control
commissions, unemployment compensation commissions and zoning
boards; the courts should be taken out of the business of approving
simple alterations of legal status such as divorces, separations, changes
of names, and adoptions, and replaced by state-wide boards set up to
expedite such proceedings.
Concurrent with this effort to simplify and demystify the substan-
tive and procedural aspects of the law, but independently of it, the
bar and the courts should re-examine their position on unauthorized
practice. Despite mounting criticism of the legal profession's failure to
provide legal services to all members of society at reasonable prices,
there has thus far been little pressure on the bar to relinquish tasks
70. See REnr. oF mE ABA SPE CO oMmTiE ON THE AvArLairry OF LEGcAL SmuVCES,
93 A.B.A. Rep. 518, 521 (1968), for the suggestion that the present scope of the profession's
monopoly claim should be preserved intact but that the profession should regard its
clients as consumers and its services as commodities-a-mailable at a price and quality, and
in a form, attractive to the consuming market. This suggestion would be acceptable to
critics such as Carlin, but as this Note attempts to show, a change of the t)pe indicated
is offensive to professionalism in theory and has very little chance, as a practical matter, of
being adopted by the legal profession. Schuckman, supra note 19, at 255.
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which do not require the skill of a lawyer. In part, this is a manifestation
of the widely-held notion, shared by critics such as Carlin, that profes-
sionalism is an answer to all sorts of problems. 1 To the extent that the
bar, with the support of the courts, refuses to allow experimentation
by lay groups that attempt to serve society in areas that the profession
has served only sporadically, this notion tends to be self-fulfilling,
Many state courts attempt to use vague definitions of "the practice
of law" to map out those areas which are exclusively for professionals, 72
and which may be reclaimed from non-professionals through unau-
thorized practice suits. 73
Other courts have resisted the sterility of definitions and have adopted
various tests such as the "incidental test" which allows legal advice to
be given and legal instruments to be prepared by non-lawyers if the
work done is "proper[ly] incident" to a regular course of business. 4
The incidental test has been restricted by courts in a few states so that
it protects lay activity only insofar as it is not compensated. 75 The
Code of Professional Responsibility suggests a further test that can be
employed by the courts:
71. Writers as diverse Tawney, Durkheim, and Brandeis have presaged the Bar's
response to contemporary criticism by regarding "professionalism" as a cure for all sorts
of difficult ailments. E. DunEmhEI, PROFESSIONAL IETHiCS AND CIVIL MORALS 29 (Cornelia
Brookield trans. 1957); R. TAWNEY, TnE ACQuisITivE SociEry, Chapt. 7, INDUSTRYi AS A
PROFE SION (1920); L. BRANDEIS, BusINEss-A PROFEssION 12 (1914). For the moment at least,
society-and the professions themselves-appear to have fallen prey to the appeal of
professionalism without giving critical attention to the limitations as well as to the
advantages of the professional model. Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 70
Am. J. oF Soc. 137 (1964).
72. Arizona State Bar v. Arizona Land Title and Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 866 P.2d 1
(1961), supp. 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962) (the practice of law consists of "those acts,
whether performed in court or in the law office, which lawyers have customarily carricd on
from day to day through the centuries"); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank and Trust
Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 (1938) (acts which are "commonly understood to be
the practice of law"); Opinion of the Justice, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 813 (1935) (tie
"customary functions of an attorney").
73. The bar has justified its unauthorized practice campaign as follows:
The unauthorized practitioner has neither the extensive legal education nor the train-
ing of a lawyer. Furthermore, he is not subject to the same high standards of conduct
as those to which lawyers must adhere. In addition, he has not met those standards
of competence set by the state which authorized a lawyer to practice law. Therefore,
persons who engage in the unauthorized practice of law do not perform a service for
the public; rather, their activities constitute a disservice both to their clients and to
the public at large.
E. STASON, UNAUTHORIZED PRAcricE SoucEn Boox, Foreword at iii (1961 ed.). It should be
apparent that such a statement is totally meaningless without a prior determination of
what constitutes the practice of law.
74. See, e.g., Creekmore v. Dzard, 236 Ark. 558, 356 S.W.2d 419 (1968); Cooperman v.
West Coast Tile Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954).
75. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 842
S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1960); Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135
Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957).
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[T]he practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others
that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence
of the professional judgment of a lawyer is his educated ability to
relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal
problem .... Where this professional judgment is not involved,
non-lawyers ... may engage in occupations that require a special
knowledge of law in certain areas.70
The problem with an approach to unauthorized practice based on the
various definitions or tests that have been employed or proposed is that
they only indirectly, if at all, reflect the rationale for licensed profes-
sional monopolies.77 The exclusion of laymen from the performance of
certain work tasks can only be justified to the extent that a valid public
interest is thereby served.78 Where the overriding public interest in the
area of legal services-competent representation at reasonable prices--
cannot be secured by a professional monopoly, and is indeed hindered
by such a monopoly, the only justification for the monopoly disappears.
To protect the public from the negligence and/or lack of training
of lawyers and laymen engaged in providing legal services, courts and
legislatures should require practitioners to make readily available to
prospective clients complete and accurate information regarding their
educational background and training. With this information at their
disposal, clients should be allowed to hire a representative from among
the wide range-in terms of skill and cost-available. The disciplinary
mechanisms of the market would be adequate to punish mild deficien-
cies in service; the courts should stand ready to punish more serious
forms of misconduct.
76. ABA CODE, EC 8-5, at 46. The phrase "professional judgment" provides an uncertain
test, if indeed it is a test at all. The illusory content of the phrae is indicated by the
following attempted justification for the limitation on the practice of law by laymen:
Since the practice of law is, in the public interest, forbidden to anyone who has not
demonstrated the requisite competence and integrity, by meeting requirements for a
law license, lawyers have a monopoly in the rendition of legal services. The existence
of this monopoly in the important area of legal services, together with the fact that
the practice of law is a profession, dictate that the directives in the proposed Code be
based upon serving the public interest. Since the public interest is served by forbidding
laymen to practice law, it is against the public interest for lawyers to aid or encourage
laymen to practice law.
Sutton, The Impact of the Code of Professional Responsibility upon the Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 48 N. Car. L. Rev. 633, 636-37 (1969).
Since the Code of Professional Responsibility does not purport to regulate the conduct
of non-lawyers, it is directly relevant here only insofar as it encourages or requires certain
conduct of lawyers in the area of unauthorized practice . anon 3 is the principal statement
in the Code on unauthorized practice: "A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Un-
authorized Practice of Law," ABA CODE, CANoN 3, at 45.
77. They do, however, reflect very nicely the "interests" of the profession. See Johnstone,
The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among Power Groups, 4 KAN. 1.
REv. 1 (1955).
78. Countryman, The Scope of the Lawyer's Special Responsibility, 26 O O ST. I.J.
66, 82-83 (1965).
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Meanwhile, the law schools have a responsibility to structure their
curricula so as to reflect the skill requirements of lawyers in widely
different types of practice. 79 The amount of education required for all
lawyers has increased substantially since the 1920's,80 despite the fact
that the work tasks of lower echelon practitioners have often not in-
creased in complexity-and those areas where there has been a spurt in
actual complexity, such as consumer protection and welfare prob-
lems, have not been dealt with in most law school curricula with
emphasis proportionate to that increase.8'
Legal education should not be used as a means to maintain the dis-
credited myth of a uniform bar with great mobility between various
areas of practice, nor as a device to maintain competition at a "healthy"
level by restricting entry into the profession and by fencing out actual
and potential lay competition. 2 This means that law schools should
be innovative in experimenting with tracking systems involving special-
ization and varying lengths of required matriculation.
Finally, when exercising their inherent power to discipline members
of the "professional" bar for deviance from the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the only concern of the courts should be whether strict
adherence to the canon in question is in the public interest.82 The
interest of the profession, however defined, should be regarded as
wholly extraneous to this determination. 4 A workable test that the
courts could apply in exercising their disciplinary power would begin
with a presumption of propriety for the activities of lawyers as long as
those activities are not in conflict with state criminal prohibitions of
general application. This presumption could be rebutted by clients or
by local bar associations on a showing of substantial injury to the client
because of the activity of his attorney. Substantial evidence of negli-
79. Overtraining of some lawyers given the tasks they will eventually perform seems
inevitable as long as the ABA clings to the notion that a general and uniform training Is
required before admission to the Bar. In many states, admissions standards are wholly
within the control of the ABA. See, e.g., New Mexico, Rule 1, § 2 (1953). Suits challenging
the validity of special requirements for the practice of law on due process or equal protec
tion grounds have been uniformly unsuccessful. See In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1893);
Hennington v. State Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 393, 291 P2d 1108 (1956).
80. Pincus, Reforming Legal Education, 53 A.B.A.J. 436 (1967).
81. Nader, Law Schools and Law Firms, Crumbling of the Old Order, Tua Nriv
REPUBLIc 20 (Oct. 11, 1969).
82. Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among Power
Groups, 4 KAN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1955).
83. See, e.g., In re Nevius, 174 Ohio St. 560, 191 N.E.2d 166 (1963); Gair v, Peck, 188
N.Y.S.2d 491, 160 N.E.2d 43 (1959), app. dis. 361 U.S. 374 (1960), mod. on other grounds,
6 N.Y.2d 983, 191 N.Y.S.2d 951, 161 N.Y.2d 786 (1959).
84. That the "professional interest" is not always so regarded is suggested by Smith,
supra note 11, at 288.
1196
Vol. 79: 1179, 1970
Legal Ethics and Professionalism
gence as well as evidence of positive wrongdoing would destroy the
initial presumption.
Adoption of such a test by the courts would doubtlessly lead to a re-
duction in the importance of the profession's code of ethics as the
lawyer's guide for behavior, but past experience with professional self-
regulation indicates that this may very well be a desirable develop-
ment. 5 In the Code of Professional Responsibility, as in the legal
profession's previous code of practice, self-regulation seems inevitably
to lead to the compromise or subordination of the public interest to the
short-range interest of the dominant segments of the profession.
But the courts' willingness to interpret the Code of Professional
Responsibility liberally when called upon to deal with specific charges
of attorney misconduct should not lull courts and legislatures into
adopting the Code as written.80 Although getting local bar associations
to agree to specific changes in the Code is likely to be difficult, the
defects noted earlier, especially the insufficient allowance for variable
conditions of practice, should be remedied before it is adopted in the
various states so as to obviate its probable chilling effect on socially
desirable conduct. The Code is likely to have such a chilling effect
despite the willingness of the courts to assume a more active role in
the disciplinary process. A court's willingness to use an ad hoc balancing
test to determine propriety may make many lawyers timid, especially
if they fear that, out of habit, courts will inevitably think in terms of
uniform prohibitions.
Far from being the key to the crisis in legal services, "unethical"
conduct among solo practitioners is but one manifestation of a profes-
sional claim gone awry. To the extent that the Code of Professional
Responsibility expresses the bar's belief that its responsibility to society
can be met by enforcing ethical standards in the profession as presently
structured, it rests on either a delusion or a deliberate avoidance of the
basic problems. The crisis in legal services can be met only by a bold
reassessment of received notions of professionalism.
85. IV. G~rnoRN, INDImVUAL lFEmom AND GOVERNmENtrAL RL rNs 105-151 (1956).
86. ABA President Bernard Segal has appointed a nine-member committee to spur early
adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility by the states. The procedures by which
the states adopt codes of legal ethics vary. In some states, favorable action by the state bar
association is all that is necessary to secure adoption. But in the majority of jurisdictions,
formal action by the state Supreme Court or the state legislature is required. It is probable
that the Code may be regarded as persuasive authority in some states without formal
approval.
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